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In their paper „A restatement of the case for fiscal 
autonomy‟ Hallwood and MacDonald (2006b) claim that 
Barnett is a formula for a rake‟s progress and that fiscal 
autonomy, as outlined in their previous paper „The 
economic case for Scottish fiscal autonomy: with or without 
independence‟ (Hallwood and MacDonald, 2006a), offers a 
superior financial settlement for Scotland. We here restate 
our continued disagreements with their argument. We start 
with corrections of their interpretation of our paper „Flaws 
and myths in the case for Scottish fiscal autonomy‟ 
(Ashcroft, Christie and Swales, 2006) before highlighting 
where we believe their latest paper fails to provide answers 
to important questions we posed. 
 
The first disagreement that we have with Hallwood and 
MacDonald‟s interpretation of our argument is that they 
imply that it is a politically motivated defence of the Barnett 
formula. This is false. It is important to state from the start 
that we do not defend Barnett against all other possible 
financing systems: rather we compare it to the system of 
fiscal autonomy proposed by Hallwood and MacDonald. 
Further, Ashcroft, Christie and Swales individually have 
differing political views and have different judgements 
concerning both the general desirability and potential 
longevity of the Barnett formula. We do, however, agree 
that the adoption of fiscal autonomy would be a dangerous 
and risky step for the Scottish economy. 
 
Second, Hallwood and MacDonald maintain that our claim 
that the Barnett formula offers a hard budget constraint „is 
based on a serious misconception of its economic 
consequences.‟ We disagree. It is the mechanism that sets 
the budget that determines whether it is hard or not, and 
the current system - with no bail-out facility and no scope 
for borrowing - sets a hard budget constraint for the 
Scottish Executive. Hallwood and MacDonald (2006b, p. 3) 
implicitly accept this, though it is tucked away in a footnote, 
when they state that under the present mechanism “… in 
principle the Scottish Executive and Parliament should be 
able to get the balance between different types of public 
spending right.” 
 
Third, Hallwood and MacDonald also accuse us of 
emphasising „the down side, or costs, of having the ability 
to have freedom over tax raising powers‟ and further that 
for a small open economy like Scotland that the spill-over 
effects of lowering taxation are likely to be positive. We do 
not deny that tax cutting can have positive effects in certain 
circumstances, but we think that it is unlikely that these 
impacts would be positive for Scotland in the manner 
suggested by Hallwood and MacDonald. In order to have a 
positive outcome any reduction in taxation must generate 
economic activity with sufficient taxable value to exceed 
previous tax income. We doubt that would be the case and 
believe it necessary to make clear the downside of any 
potential change. It should also be noted the proposed oil 
fund requires a level of taxable income above the existing 
level otherwise expenditure would require to be cut to 
make payments into this fund. The example of Luxemburg, 
while interesting, draws an unlikely analogy with Scotland. 
 
Fourth, Hallwood and MacDonald state that we make a 
case for the status quo when we argue that „Hallwood and 
MacDonald‟s proposals are likely to increase the pressure 
on Scottish MPs at Westminster.‟ We do not set out to 
ease the lives of representatives at Westminster. However 
we do believe that any change to the system of financing 
the devolved administrations would have repercussions 
well beyond those introduced in Hallwood and 
MacDonald‟s initial paper and that these cannot be 
ignored. The issue of representation at Westminster is one 
of these concerns. In their first paper, Hallwood and 
MacDonald abstracted from the constitutional problems 
inherent in their proposals. They pay more heed to these 
concerns in their latest paper, now asserting that the 
political implications of fiscal autonomy within the Union are 
infeasible and opt instead for independence. Of course it is 
quite legitimate to argue for or against Scottish 
independence on economic grounds but this is quite 
different from arguing about the most appropriate way to 
finance devolved government. 
 
In terms of their restatement of their own argument, we do 
not believe that the case for fiscal autonomy is more 
forcibly made than it was previously. We stand by our 
earlier representation of the comparison of fiscal autonomy 
as against the present arrangements. These are that under 
the present funding system to Scotland, the benefits are an 
automatic macroeconomic stabilisation level and a public 
expenditure per capita substantially above the UK average. 
This is to be compared with the potential for retaining North 
Sea oil revenues and the supposed growth potential 
unlocked by fiscal autonomy. 
 
In our view the theoretical arguments for the improvement 
in growth are weak. However, Hallwood and MacDonald 
seem to base their support for fiscal autonomy more 
squarely on empirical grounds: they believe that there is 
“accumulating empirical evidence” in favour of their 
position. Roy (2006) reviews the empirical evidence 
elsewhere in this issue and finds conflicting support for this 
view. 
 
However, from our perspective the bottom line is simply 
that no other country in the world operates a system of 
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fiscal autonomy, as proposed by Hallwood 
and MacDonald, so that there is simply no 
evidence as to how effective it would be. 
We think that, in itself, is significant. 
Adopting such a system of fiscal autonomy 
would be an extremely risky step. Hallwood 
and MacDonald (2006a, p. 32) assert that 
“… the incentive generating effects of fiscal 
autonomy could be so great that the 
potential returns from fiscal autonomy could 
outweigh the potential risks”. Using 
terminology from the finance literature, they 
state that: in moving to fiscal autonomy, 
Scotland would accept a “risk- return trade 
off”, presumably partially bolstered by North 
Sea oil revenues. Recall that in Hogarth‟s 
engravings of the Rake‟s Progress, the rake 
ends up in Bedlam via debtors‟ prison after 
gambling away his inheritance. Is it the 
present system or fiscal autonomy that is 
more likely to lead Scotland along this rocky 
road? 
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